Lecture 15: August 14, 2003 Blackout

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Announcements

• Read Chapter 7 (the term reliability is now used instead of security)

• Midterm exam is Oct 18 in class
  • Off campus students should work with Iyke to get their exam proctoring setup
  • Closed book, closed notes, but calculators and one 8.5 by 11 inch note sheet allowed
  • Exam covers up to the end of today’s lecture
  • Book material is intended to be supplementary; nothing from the book not covered in class or homework will be on the exam
Blackouts

- Blackouts are costly, with some estimates of costs above $100 billion per year.
- But blackouts are not created equal. Some are unavoidable due to large scale system damage (hurricanes, tornados and ice storms). Most are local, distribution issues.
Avoidable Transmission Level Blackouts

• Many major blackouts can be prevented.
• Time frames of the blackouts, minutes to hours, allow for human intervention
  • Tokyo 1987 (20 minutes), WECC 1996 (six minutes), Eastern Interconnect 2003 (about an hour), Italy 2003 (25 minutes)
• And of course many are prevented, and hence do not make the news. For example, near voltage collapse in Delmarva Peninsula, 1999.
Going Back in Time

• The August 14\textsuperscript{th} 2003 blackout is rapidly moving from being a “recent event” into history; yet it still has much to teach us.

• This talk is about the past and the future: what can we learn from the past to help us prepare for the future
  • But not so much about what are the immediate lessons from the Blackout since many recommendations have already been put into practice.

• The blackout final report is very readable and available by googling “August 14 2003 Blackout Report”
In contrasting numbers, the August 14 2003 Blackout hit about 50 million people, while Hurricane Irene caused power outages affecting perhaps seven or eight million.
August 14, 2003 Hoax Image

This image was widely circulated immediately after the blackout, even appearing for a time on a DOE website. It was quickly shown to be a hoax.

What might immediately give it away?
Actual Before and After Images
Causes of the Blackout

• Blackout Final Report listed four causes
  • FirstEnergy (FE) did not understand inadequacies of their system, particularly with respect to voltage instability.
  • Inadequate situational awareness by FE
  • FE failed to adequately manage their tree growth
  • Failure of the grid reliability organizations (primarily MISO) to provide effective diagnostic support
• Human/cyber interactions played a key role
We’ve Come Quite a Ways Since 2003

• Report included 46 recommendations, many of which have dramatically changed the operation of the interconnected power grid
  • Thirteen were focused on physical and cyber security
• Focus of talk is what can 8/14/03 teach us to help with the grid in 2013
• Need to keep in mind economic impact of 8/14/03 was above $5 billion; yearly impact of blackouts could be above $100 billion
First Energy Control Center, Recent (late 2000’s)

My Involvement in Blackout Investigation

• I spend a lot of time talking to reporters on 8/14 to 8/16, before I knew what happened
• Tasked by DOE to do onsite visit to FE on 8/19 to 8/21 with Doug Wiegmann; did similar visit to MISO the next week.
• Did return visit in Oct
• Many folks played far larger roles; I was only involved extensively early on
Footprints of Reliability Coordinators in Midwest
August 13, 2003

- It is important to realize that immediately before the blackout few people thought the system was on the verge of a catastrophe.
- NERC 2003 Summer Assessment did not list Ohio as an area of particular concern.

August 14, 2003: Pre-blackout
(before 14:30 EDT)

• It had mostly been a normal summer day at First Energy
  • Most generation was available though the 883 MW Davis-Besse Nuclear unit was on a long-term outage
  • At 13:31 EDT the Eastlake 5 unit (a 597 MW plant on Lake Erie) tripped when the operator tried to up is reactive output, but this was not seen as a severe event
• It had been a busy day at MISO, with their reliability coordinators dealing with a relatively small outage in Indiana around noon
  • Their state estimator failed at 1215 EDT but no one know this
Cinergy Bedford-Columbus 345 kV Line Tree Contact at 12:08 EDT
Trees were Finally “Trimmed” Two Months Later
At 14:27 EDT Star-South Canton 345 kV Line Trips and Recloses

• Star-South Canton is a tie between AEP & FE
• FE missed seeing this event since their alarms had hung several minutes earlier (14:14)
  • Line was back in service so it appeared normal in SCADA
  • FE IT folks knew about computer problems
• AEP called FE at 14:32 to check on event; FE says they saw nothing. A repeat call by AEP to FE at 15:19 also discusses event indicating ground current was detected.
Estimated High Level Voltage Profile at 15:00 EDT
Estimated Flows in Northeast Ohio at 15:00 EDT on August 14th 2003

Chamberlin-Harding 345 kV Line trips at 15:05, an event that was missed by both FE and MISO.
Chamberlin-Harding was NOT on the ECAR Map (but was on FE’s Maps)
Estimated Flows in Northeast Ohio at 15:06 EDT
Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs)

• LODFs are used to approximate the change in the flow on one line caused by the outage of a second line
  • typically they are only used to determine the change in the MW flow
  • LODFs are used extensively in real-time operations
  • LODFs are state-independent (calculated using dc power flow approximations) but do dependent on the assumed network topology
  • Below value tells change of real power flow on line $\ell$ for the assumed outage of line $k$; $f_k^0$ is (obviously) pre-contingent

$$\Delta f_\ell = d_{\ell,k} f_k^0$$
Flowgates

• The real-time loading of the power grid is accessed via “flowgates”

• A flowgate “flow” is the real power flow on one or more transmission element for either base case conditions or a single contingency
  • contingent flows are determined using LODFs

• Flowgates are used as proxies for other types of limits, such as voltage or stability limits

• Flowgates are calculated using a spreadsheet
Flowgate #2265

- Flowgate 2265 monitors the flow on FE’s Star-Juniper 345 kV line for contingent loss of the Hanna-Juniper 345 Line
  - normally the LODF for this flowgate is 0.361
  - flowgate has a limit of 1080 MW
  - at 15:05 EDT the flow as 517 MW on Star-Juniper, 1004 MW on Hanna-Juniper, giving a flowgate value of $520 + 0.361 \times 1007 = 884$ (82%)
  - Chamberlin-Harding 345 opened at 15:05; FE and MISO all missed seeing this
The Bad LODF that Maybe Blacked Out the Northeast

- At 15:06 EDT (after loss of Chamberlin-Harding 345) #2265 has an incorrect value because its LODF was not automatically updated.
  - Value should be $633 + 0.463 \times 1174 = 1176$ (109%)
  - Value was $633 + 0.361 \times 1174 = 1057$ (98%)
- At 15:32 the flowgate’s contingent line opened, causing the flowgate to again show the correct value, about 107%
Flows at 15:33 EDT
Northeast Ohio 138 kV Voltage Contour: 15:33 EDT
IT Issues

- MISO RCs had gotten many hundreds of “alarms”
- Contingency analysis results were giving pages of violations.
- SE would fail because of severe system stress
- Inadequate procedures for dealing with SE failure.
- FE control center would get “many phone calls;” information was not effectively shared.
Flows in Northeast Ohio at 15:46 EDT on August 14th 2003
Northeast Ohio 138 kV Voltage Contour: 15:46 EDT
What Could Have Been Done?
Sammis-Star Flow Sensitivities

DOE/NERC report said about 1500 MW of load shed were needed.
Flows in Northeast Ohio at 16:05 EDT on August 14th 2003
Northeast Ohio 138 kV Voltage Contour: 16:05 EDT
Path to Cleveland Blocked after Loss of Sammis-Star 16:05:57
345 kV Lines Trip Across Ohio to West at 16:09
Generation Trips 16:09:08 – 16:10:27
Parts of Ohio/Michigan Served Only from Ontario after 16:10:37
Major Power Reversal: 16:10:38
Ontario/Michigan Interface Flows and Voltage
Ties from PJM to New York Open: 16:10:44 (North Ohio Black)
System Islands Break Up and Collapse: 16:10-16:13

Areas Affected by the Blackout
Service maintained in some area

Some Local Load Interrupted
Are DC LODFs Accurate? August 14th Crash Test

- Here are some results from August 14th

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Contingency</th>
<th>Element</th>
<th>LODF</th>
<th>ΔMW (pred)</th>
<th>ΔMW (act)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15:05</td>
<td>Chamberlin-Harding 345</td>
<td>Hanna-Juniper 345</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:32</td>
<td>Hanna-Juniper 345</td>
<td>Star-Juniper 345</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>527</td>
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<tr>
<td>15:46</td>
<td>CantonCentral-Cloverdale 138</td>
<td>Sammis-Star 345</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:46</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>Cloverdale-Star 138</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:06</td>
<td>Sammis-Star 345</td>
<td>Star-Juniper 345</td>
<td>numerous</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Star-Urban 138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.Canton-Dale 138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:06</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>Ashtabula-Perry 345</td>
<td>numerous</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Results are Actually Quite Good!

- The initial LODF values were accurate to within a few percent.
- Even after more than a dozen contingencies, with many voltages well below 0.9 pu, the purely DC LODF analysis was giving fairly good (with 25%) results.
What Could Have Occurred on August 14th?

• With 20/20 Hindsight the blackout probably could have been prevented. A smarter grid might have provided the necessary situational awareness, and/or provided the dynamic load reduction necessary to keep the system from cascading.

• But key issues are 1) which grid improvement costs are cost justified, and 2) what are we missing?
How Could a Smart Grid Help?

• Under frequency and under voltage relays can provide quick reduction in the load, but they need to be smart enough to make the right decision.

• Dynamic pricing (LMPs) can help customers make economic decisions, but they depend upon a variety of “advanced applications” in order to calculate the LMPs: state estimation converging to provide the model for the SCOPF.
Some Thoughts on Current Needs

• The data used in the models for interconnect wide studies still have significant problems
• In US we have 90GW of wind resources, but do not always have adequate models for transient stability studies; there are also potential low voltage ride through issues with solar
• Power grid is rapidly changing which can result in some operational “surprises”
• High impact, low frequency events are a concern
• We need people with a deep knowledge of power systems and (fill in the blank)!